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wholly choate or wholly inchoate. This preferable view has been ex-
pressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in United States v. Bond in the following words:
"The Congress did not prefer the principal of the mortgage
debt; it preferred the mortgagee. If the word is to be given its
usual meaning the preference cannot be limited to the mort-
gagee's right to repayment of the principal of the mortgage debt.
It extends to all those rights which the Congress must have
known the mortgagee commonly and usually possesses."
4 6
W1VLDON J. SMI'r
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S VESTED RIGHT IN A
VOID JUDGMENT
It is almost universally held that courts of record have inherent
power to vacate civil judgments at any time during the entire term
at which they are rendered.' It is usually held that the same rule ap-
plies in criminal cases. 2
A variation on the usual factual situation arose in Florida, in
Michell v. State ex rel. Callahan.3 John Thomas Callahan, Jr., a
minor, was charged with robbery in the Court of Record in and for
Broward County, on April 6, 1962. He was represented by the public
defender. A plea of guilty was entered, and he was adjudged guilty.
On April 19, 1962, he was sentenced to one year in the county jail.
Subsequently, on or about May 12, 1962, the judge learned that Cal-
lahan was a minor, and that a Florida statute4 requiring "notice to
parents" had not been complied with. On May 24, 1962, the judge,
upon the court's own motion, and during the same term of court,
entered an order vacating and setting aside the prior proceeding in
its entirety, on the ground it was void. On the same day, following
the giving of statutory notice to Callahan's parents, as required by
law, the defendant was reprosecuted for the same crime. Again rep-
resented by the public defender, he pleaded nolo contendere. This
4279 F.2d at 851.
1i Freeman, Judgments § 194 (1925); 3oA Am. Jur. Judgments § 629 (1958); 49
C.J.S. Judgments § 228 (1947); Annot. 168 A.L.R. 204 (1947).2
United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 3o6-07 (1931); Whitman, Federal Criminal
Procedure § 35-3 (195o; 15 Am. Jur. Criminal Law § 473 (1938); 21 C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 16o5(1) (1961).
8154 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
'Fla. Stat. Ann. § 932.38 (1944).
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time he was adjudged guilty and sentenced to seven years at hard
labor in the state penitentiary. On June 5, 1962, the defendant filed
a petition for habeas corpus5 in the Circuit Court for the i 5 th Ju-
dicial Circuit.6 This court set aside the May 24 sentence and directed
the trial court to impose a sentence not longer than that imposed after
the first conviction. This order was appealed to the District Court of
Appeal, which reversed, holding that since the seven-year sentence
was within the discretion given the trial court by statute,7 the appellate
courts were barred from modifying it. It further held that the trial
judge acted properly in vacating the original proceeding, and that the
defendant could not complain about being prosecuted a second time.
The holding with respect to the reviewability of the second sen-
tence is consistent with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court of
Florida, that is, provided the second judgment was valid. In Nowling
v. State s the Florida Supreme Court adopted a rule that Florida ap-
pellate courts had power to reduce excessive sentences, but in Brown
v. State,9 the court receded from the holding in Nowling, and held
that when the sentence is within the limits prescribed by statute, the
only remedy for an excessive sentence is by petition to the Pardon
Board.10 According to the decision in Brown, a sentence within the
statutory limits cannot be reviewed by an appellate court even if the
defendant alleges that his punishment is cruel and unusual," and
There is some question as to whether habeas corpus is a proper method of
attacking a sentence as excessive. Annot., 76 A.L.R. 468 (1932). However, the court
heard the petition on the ground that the appeal time had elapsed. But see Mc-
Guire v. Cochran, 135 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1961), which held that where the appeal time
had not expired, habeas corpus was improper. There is a further question as to
whether habeas corpus is, in this case, a proper method of advancing the plea
of double jeopardy, as it does not appear that the defendant objected to retrial or
appealed the second conviction. Irvin v. Chapman, 75 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1954); State
ex rel. Johnson v. Mayo, 69 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1954).
OThe 15th Judicial Circuit is comprised of Broward and Palm Beach counties.
The Circuit Court is not an appellate court as to the Court of Record in felony
cases. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 26.53 (1961). But it has authority to grant habeas corpus.
Fla. Const. Art. 5, § 6. See Hancock v. Dupree, ioo Fla. 617, 129 So. 822 (193o).
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 813.O1 (Supp. 1962). This statute provides that the punish-
ment for robbery shall be "ili the state prison for life or for any lesser term of
years, at the discretion of the court." It appears that the trial court was permitted
to sentence defendant to one year in the county jail by virtue of Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 922.05 (1944), and therefore the first sentence, standing alone, was not unlawful
for the reason that it imposed imprisonment in a place unauthorized by law.
"151 Fla. 58-1, 1o So. 2d 130 (1942).
"152 Fla. 853, 13 So. 2d 458 (1943).
"Florida has both a Pardon Board and a Parole Commission. These two bodies
have separate and distinct functions. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 947.o (1944), and Fla.
Const. Art. 4 § 12.
ni 5 - Fla. 853, 13 So. 2d 458, 461 (1943)-
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therefore violative of section 8 of the Florida Declaration of Rights.
Therefore, if the second judgment in the present case is valid, it seems
that Brown v. State is controlling authority that under Florida law
the sentence imposed pursuant thereto, being within the statutory
limits, is not reviewable. 12
More difficult problems arise, however, in connection with the
procedure followed by the trial judge after he became aware of de-
fendant's age. These procedures, and their possible consequences,
merit close examination.
Upon becoming aware that defendant was a minor, the trial judge,
upon his own motion, set aside the original proceedings in their en-
tirely. He did this on the theory that the original proceeding was void
for lack of compliance with the "notice to parents" statute. The
first question that arises is whether the trial court had authority to do
this. There appears to be no express statutory authority for the trial
court to vacate, upon its own motion, a void criminal judgment, nor
are there any cases from Florida so holding, except by way of dicta.'3
It is frequently said, however, that a criminal court has the power to
vacate void judgments during the term of court at which they are
rendered,1 4 and the Supreme Court of Florida has held in several
cases that where the "notice to parents" statute is not complied with,
the proceedings and judgment pursuant thereto are void.' Futher-
more, the Supreme Court of Florida has used broad language in de-
scribing the power of a court over its judgments.1 There can be
'-See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 924.32 (1944); Fla. Appellate Rules, Rule 6.16(a) (Supp.
1962); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 924.05, 924.06 (1944), which concern the scope of review
of Florida appellate courts. It appears that the power to review criminal sentences
as excessive is not expressly withheld from the appellate courts. Brown v. State,
supra note 9, appears to be no denial of the power to modify an excessive sentence;
rather it is a disclaimer of the right to exercise power on grounds appealing only
to clemency, or to substitute it for the executive power of commutation.
"Casey v. State, 116 Fla. 3, 156 So. 282 (1934); Preston v. State, 117 I"a. 618,
158 So. 135 (1934); Sawyer v. State, 94 Fla. 6o, 113 So. 736 (1927). See also Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 921.o n.5 (1944), concerning the vacation of criminal judgments. The court
in the principal case, at p. 703, states that the trial court was under a duty to
vacate the first judgment. No citation of authority for this position is given.
"'Supra note a, 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 16o5(3) (1961). People v. Blalock, 170
Cal. App. ad 307, 338 P.2d 578 (1959).
uVellucci v. Cochran, 138 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1962); Giles v. Cochran, 129 So. ad
42j6 (Fla. 1961); McGuirk v. Cochran, 126 So. 2d 555 (Fla. ig6i); Raggen v. Coch-
ran, 126 So. ad 145 (Fla. ig6i); Thompson v. Cochran, 126 So. ad 564 (Fla. 1961);
Williams v. Cochran, 126 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1961); Willis v. Cochran, 131 So. ad 728
(Fla. 1961).
"In Lake v. State, ioo Fla. 373, 129 So. 827, 829 (1g3o), the court said: "We
have examined the treatment of this question in many jurisdictions, and the rule
seems well-nigh universal that, in the absence of statutory or constitutional pro-
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little doubt that if defendant had moved for vacation of the first
judgment and sentence, the trial court would have been under a
duty to vacate them. But whether the court itself may vacate the judg-
ment is a harder question, because when it does so, the possibility
immediately arises that upon retrial the defendant may plead double
or former jeopardy.
Florida adheres to the view that a void judgment may not be
pleaded as a basis of former jeopardy. In Tilghman v. Mayo,17 the
court said: "The very fact that the former judgment was void is the
reason it cannot be effectively pleaded as a basis of former jeopardy."'s
Since the first judgment in the principal case was held to be void,19
the Tilghman case is cited by the court as compelling authority for
rejecting a double jeopardy argument. But there is a basic difference
between the facts in Tilghman and those of the principal case. In
Tilghman, it was the defendant himself who attacked the prior judg-
nent; in the present case it was the court. This is a relevant dis-
tinction. It is recognized and admitted in the cases, that where the
defendant himself attacks the prior judgment, he cannot thereafter
plead that judgment as former jeopardy.2 0 This position can be sup-
ported on the ground that the defendant has waived his right to rely
on former jeopardy.2' If it is not the defendant who attacks the judg-
visions controlling, prior to the adjournment of the term or other time in which
the cause passes beyond the jurisdiction of the court and becomes final, any court
of record has full control over its judgments or decrees and can set them aside or
reform them as it may deem right and legal. The rule applies to civil and criminal
cases alike and may be effected on the court's own motion or on being advised by
any party in interest."
r'82 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1955).
L'3d. at 137.
n"The court in the principal case states that it is not the judgment only which
is void, but the entire prior proceeding; trial, judgment, and sentence. The court
goes on to say at p. 7o4 n.2, that it was able to find only one other such case, State
v. O'Keith, 136 Kan. 283, 15 P.2d 443 (1932). That case involved a criminal action
tried before a court without jurisdiction. The dearth of authority on this point is
undoubtedly due to the fact that most courts do not distinguish between a void
judgment and a wholly void proceeding.
uBryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (195o); Williams v. United States, 170
F.2d 3i9 (sth Cir. 1948); Allen v. State, 26o Ala. 324, 1o So. 2d 644 (1954); Cole v.
State, 211 Ark. 836, 202 S.W.2d 770 (1947); State v. Phillips, 175 Kan. 50, 259 P.2d
185 (1953); Crum v. State, 216 Miss. 78o, 63 So. 2d 242 (1953); State v. Lamoreaux,
2o N.J. Super. 65, 89 A.2d 469 (1952); Village of Avon v. Popa, 96 Ohio App. 147,
121 N.E.2d 254 (1953); Commonwealth v. Balles, 163 Pa. Super. 467, 61 A.2d 91
(1948); Whitehead v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 507, 286 S.W.2d 947 (1956); State v.
Hutchinson, 4 Utah 2d 404, 295 P.2d 345 (1956).
"People v. Zendano, 31 Misc. 2d 145, 136 N.Y.S.2d io6 (Erie County Ct. 1954);
Cross v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 77 S.E.2d 447 (1953); Johnson v. Cranor, 43
Wash. 2d oo, 26o P.2d 873 (1953).
19641
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ment, however, there can be no waiver. United States v. Ball,s2 in-
volved defendants who were originally tried for murder upon a
fatally defective indictment, found guilty, and sentenced to death.
They appealed this conviction, and it was set aside by the United
States Supreme Court, on account of the defective indictment. 23
Upon reprosecution for the same offense upon a proper indictment,
they pleaded double jeopardy. In considering their conviction to the
second indictment, and the argument of double jeopardy, the Supreme
Court said:
"How far, if they had taken no steps to set aside the proceed-
ings in the former case, the judgment and sentence therein
could have been held to bar a new indictment against them
need not be considered, because it is quite clear that a de-
fendant who procures a verdict against him upon an indictment
to be set aside, may be tried anew upon the same indictment, or
upon another indictment, for the same offense of which he had
been convicted." 24
This language, while it leaves the question open, hints that a dif-
ferent result might follow where the defendant does not initiate the
attack upon the former judgment. Such a different result was reached
in fact, in the case of Burke v. United States,2 which was decided on
the basis of the foregoing language from United States v. Ball. The
Burke case is very similar on its facts to the principal case. There, a
husband was charged with nonsupport, but the indictment was fatally
defective. The defendant was convicted, and sentenced to one year
in prison. On motion of government counsel, the first judgment was
vacated, and defendant was reprosecuted and again sentenced to one
year. In upholding his plea of former jeopardy, the court said:
"It has been held that a valid information is a prerequisite
to the attaching of jeopardy, but the cases so holding involve
situations where the information or indictment is dismissed on
motion of accused, or before judgment on the merits and
service of sentence. Here we have an entirely different situa-
tion. Judgment was entered in the first case on appellant's
plea of guilty, he served a portion of his sentence, and did not
initiate the proceeding which lead [sic] to his release from cus-
tody and the ensuing resentence." 26
2163 U.S. 662 (1896). See also i Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 139
at 313 (1957).
Ball v. United States, 14o U.S. in8 (i8gi).
24163 U.S. 662, 672 (x896).
Z1 o3 A.2d 347 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1954).
"Old. at 352-53 (emphasis by court). See also Re Bouchard, 38 Cal. App. ,41,
176 Pac. 692 (Dist. Ct. App. 1918).
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The question resolves itself to this: Is a defendant put in jeopardy
by a proceeding, judgment, and sentence which will be, upon attack
by the defendant, the state, or the court, set aside as invalid? It seems
the answer must be yes, because until attacked, any judgment, even a
void one, is sufficient to deprive the defendant of his liberty.27 And if a
defendant is so deprived of his liberty under such a judgment and
sentence, it seems unrealistic to say that he was not in jeopardy. The
least that can be said is that due to the distinction pointed out above,
the Florida cases on double jeopardy are not controlling in the pres-
ent situation, and that the court would have been at liberty to hold
that the defendant in this case was subjected to double jeopardy.
Another possible consequence of retrial under the circumstances
in the present case, is a plea by defendant that he was not accorded
due process of law. Due process of law is guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and by section
12 of the Florida Declaration of Rights. It does not appear that any
argument was made pursuant to either of these provisions, but such
arguments would have been appropriate. There are certain factors
present in this case which make the imposition of the second sentence,
which is seven times more severe than the first, particularly harsh.
First, the statute requiring notice to parents is for the benefit of de-
fendant,28 not the state; therefore the state was not prejudiced by
noncompliance. Indeed it seems anomalous that noncompliance with
a statute for defendant's protection should be used as a means to
obtain his retrial and subjection to a more severe punishment. The
state cannot be prejudiced if defendant is serving a void sentence,
because if he challenges the sentence, he waives his right to plead
double jeopardy, and may be retried. He cannot escape punishment,
unless it be by acquittal at the second trial. Second, the error result-
ing in noncompliance was made by the state, not by the defendant.
Third, the defendant did not attack the judgment; the attack was
made by the trial court. Fourth, defendant was a minor.29 Fifth, no
-2Both the Ball case and the Burke case recognize that a trial pursuant to
a fatally defective indictment is sufficient to put a defendant in jeopardy. In the
present case, there is no evidence that the indictment was defective; the only defect
in the procedure was the failure of the state to notify defendant's parents as re-
quired by law. This seems, a fortiori, a stronger case than either Ball or Burke
for holding that the defendant was put in jeopardy at the first trial.
2 See Pitts v. State, 88 Fla. 438, 102 So. 554 (1924).
!'-The court in Stanford v. State, 11o So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1959) viewed this factor
differently. In upholding harsh sentences imposed on several minors, the court
said: "This Court takes judicial knowledge of the fact that all these young men
are within the age group that commits a very large percentage of the crimes in this
nation." Id. at 2.
19641
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new matter was shown to have been brought out at the second trial.30
These factors, taken together, accentuate the hardship of the second
sentence. It is felt, in short, that the procedural treatment accorded
defendant violated minimum standards of fairness, and did not con-
stitute due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution and by section 12 of the Florida
Declaration of Rights.
RICIHARD V. MATrINGLY, JR.
THE ATTORNEY'S RETAINING LIEN
In his efforts to collect fees charged to clients, the attorney is aided
by the common law general or retaining lien.' The retaining lien2 gives
the attorney the right to retain possession of a client's documents,
money, or other property which the attorney has acquired while per-
forming professional services for the dient.3 The lien continues until
the balance due the attorney for his services is paid.4
'The court said: "We cannot ascertain from the record why the trial court
imposed a seven-year sentence upon the petitioner, after having imposed only a
one-year sentence in the void proceedings. But this court is not at liberty to pass
upon that matter." 154 So. 2d at 7o3.
1Brown, Personal Property § 115 (2d ed. 1955).
'The fundamental characteristics of the retaining lien differ from those of
the attorney's charging lien. The charging lien attaches to any fund or judgment
which is obtained for a client by means of an attorney's professional services. It is
specific in that it covers only services rendered by the attorney in the action in
which the judgment was received, while the retaining lien is a general one for the
balance of accounts between the attorney and his client. In re Heinsheimer, 159 App.
Div. 33, 143 N.Y. Supp. 895 (1913). See generally: Hanna Paint Mfg. Co. v. Rodey,
Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, 298 F.2d 371 (0oth Cir. 1962); Locke v. Barranco, 267
Ala. 37o, 102 So. 2d 2 (1958); Camp v. Park, 226 Ark. O026, 295 S.W. 2d 613 (1956);
Robertson v. Robertson, 1O6 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); State ex rel. Shan-
non v. Hendricks Circuit Court, 183 N.E.2d 331 (Ind. 1962); Neighbors & Danielson v.
West Neb. Methodist Tosp., 162 Neb. 816, 77 N.W.2d 667 (1956); Republic Factors,
Inc. v. Carteret Work Uniforms, 24 N.J. 525, 133 A.2d 6 (1957); Morgan v. Onassis,
5 N.Y.2d 732, 1.52 N.E.2d 670, 177 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1958); Butler v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 203 Tenn. 366, 313 S.W.2d 260 (1958).
1McCracken v. City of Joliet, 271 Ill. 270, 111 N.E. 131 (1915); Foss v. Cobler,
1o5 Iowa 728, 75 N.W. 516 (1898); Board of County Comm'rs of Edwards County v.
Simmons, 159 Kan. 41, 151 P.2d 96o (1944); In re Anderson's Estate, 174 Neb. 398,
i8 N.W.2d 339 (1962); Reynolds v. Warner, 128 Neb. 304, 258 N.W. 462 (1935);
Cones v. Brooks, 6o Neb. 698, 84 N.W. 85 (igoo); Morse v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 65 Nev. 275, 195 P.2d 199 (1948); Prichard v. Fulmer, 22 N.M. 134, 159 Pac.
39 (i916); Robinson v. Rogers, 237 N.Y. 467, 143 N.E. 647 (1924); Capehart v.
Church, 136 W. Va. 929, 69 S.E.2d 127 (1952).
'Capehart v. Church, 136 W. Va. 929, 69 S.E.2d 127 (1952). But the retaining
lien is a "passive" lien, that is, one not enforceable by legal proceedings. Sorin v.
Shahmoon Indus., Inc., 191 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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The nature and extent of the retaining lien was recently considered
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Brauer v. Hotel Associates, Inc.5
The hotel had become insolvent and its law firm filed a claim for
S7,5oo with the receiver for professional services rendered prior to its
insolvency. In addition, the law firm asserted a retaining lien on all
documents, records, and books of the corporation in its possession.0
The receiver denied the validity of the lien on the following
grounds: (i) the books, records, and documents of the corporation were
in possession of the law firm because one of its members was the reg-
istered agent of the corporation; (2) the retaining lien was dissolved by
the insolvency of the corporation and appointment of a receiver; and
(3) the subject of the lien was of no intrinsic value and, therefore,
could not be asserted.
The Chancery Division upheld the lien, and on that basis gave the
law firm a priority on its claim as an administrative expense. On re-
view,7 the Supreme Court in a four to three decision affirmed the hold-
ing of the Chancery Division.
Although the retaining lien attaches without commencement of
a lawsuit in the client's behalfs and also without court order,9 there
is a stringent requirement .that the attorney have obtained possess-
ion 10 of the retained items by reason of his professional employment.1
Thus, in the principal case the receiver's primary argument was that
the law firm had possession of the items because one of the partners
in the firm was the corporation's registered agent and not by virtue
of its professional employment. The court pointed out that the corpo-
ration's transfer books were in the possession of the firm for the rea-
son contended by the receiver and that no lien attached to them. How-
ever, the divided court decided that the lien did attach to other records
r4o N.J. 415, 192 A.2d 831 (1963).6 The receiver was granted an order requiring the law firm to relinquish pos-
session of the books and records; however, the court held in abeyance the question
of the firm's alleged retaining lien and its possible right to a priority over the
corporation's general creditors.
7The receiver appealed to the Appellate Division but the Supreme Court
granted certification on its own motion prior to argument before the Appellate
Division. R.R. 1:,o-,(a).
8De La Paz v. Costal Petroleum Transp. Co., 136 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
OManusse v. Mattia, 1o N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
10A condition precedent to exertion of the retaining lien is actual possession of
the items by the attorney. Cuomo v. Pennsylvania R.R., 157 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa.
1957); Gary v. Cohen, 34 Misc. 2d 971, 231 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
uAkers v. Akers, 233 Minn. 133, 46 N.V.2d 87 (1951); Lindsley v. Caldwell, 234
Mo. 498, 137 S.V. 983 (1911); Thomson v. Findlater Hardware Co., 1o9 Tex. 235,
.205 S.W. 831 (1918).
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and documents which the firm had in its possession, since as to them,
the firm performed services other than services required of it as reg-
istered agent.
It appears that the three dissenting judges thought that the corpo-
ration's documents and books were held by the firm for a special pur-
pose, that is, as registered agent. Such special purpose would preclude
the retaining lien. For example, it was held in Akers v. Akers12 that
furs and wedding rings of a client in a divorce action were held by
the attorney for the special purpose of keeping them beyond the
reach of the defendant in the divorce action and not as security for
the payment of the attorney's fees. Similarly, the retaining lien has
been held not to attach to a note where it was delivered to an attor-
ney as collateral security for a separate debt owed the attorney. 13
The preceding are clear examples of what some courts have con-
sidered special purposes, but in the principal case the special purpose
is not so clear cut. Though more subtle, the situation in the principal
case was very close to that found in the Missouri case of Lindsley v.
Caldwell,14 where a special confidential relationship and express agree-
ment existed between the firm and its client and thus precluded the
lien. In the Lindsley case certain shares of stock were placed in the
attorney's name as confidential advisor of his client under an express
agreement that the attorney would indorse and deliver the stock to
the client on demand. 15
The receiver in the principal case asserted, secondly, that the re-
taining lien was dissolved by reason of the insolvency of the client
and appointment of a receiver, but this contention was summarily dis-
missed by the court. Visconti v. M.E.M. Corporation6 was cited for
the proposition that a receiver takes only such title as the insolvent
corporation has and such title is subject to all liens arising prior to
the insolvency.
The receiver's third argument, in which he asserted that the lien
should not be upheld because the subject of the lien was of no in-
trinsic value, had little foundation. The court found that the actual
or intrinsic value of the items retained under the retaining lien was
not material. The rule is stated that the value of the lien comes not
from the intrinsic value or worth of the items as chattels, but from the
inconvenience caused the client by his inability to gain access to the
3"233 Minn. 1.33, 46 N.W.2d 87 (1951).
Thomson v. Findlater Hardware Co., 1O9 Tex. 235, 2o5 S.W. 831 (1918).
"234 Mo. 498, 137 S.W. 983 (1911).
15Ibid.
167 N.J. Super. 271, 73 A.zd 74 (App. Div. 1950).
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items.' 7 It should be noted, however, that the inconvenience caused
the client may not be carried to extremes.' s For example, it was said
in Robinson v. Rogers:
"[T]hat where the retention of papers by an attorney serves
to embarrass a client the attorney should be required to deliver
up the papers upon receiving proper security for his compen-
sation, because insistence upon his lien under such circum-
stances is not in accordance with that standard of conduct which
the court may properly require of its officers."'19
There is a dearth of authority on the attorney's retaining lien as
it applies to criminal proceedings, a case involving Hauptmann, ac-
cused of the Lindburgh kidnapping, apparently being the only one
reported in which the point was involved. In Hauptmann v. Fawcett,20
Hauptmann made a motion in a New York court for an order direct-
ing a first attorney "to turn over all files and papers in his matters to
his new attorney."' 1 Since the attorney was an officer of the court,
the court held that he should be required to turn over to Hauptmann
any "papers which would be of value to the defendant in his de-
fense."2 2 The court ordered a hearing before a judge, at which both
the first and second attorneys could determine which papers were of
value and which should be delivered to Hauptmann. This order was
later modified so as to provide that the lien was not lost and that the
documents be returned to the first attorney after the completion of
the trial.23
With the exception of the unique situation in the Hauptmann
case, it appears that in all cases where the attorney has asserted a
valid retaining lien and has, nevertheless, been ordered by a court to
part with the retained items, the client has been ordered to post bond
or other adequate security for the claim of the attorney.24 In two re-
spects it seems that the substitution works for the attorney's benefit:
(i) the new security is by its nature of intrinsic value while the re-
tained items may or may not have been of some intrinsic value; (2)
"The Flush, 277 Fed. 25 (2d Cir. 1921); In re Allied Owners' Corp., 72 F.2d 255
(2d Cir. 1934); In re San Juan Gold, Inc., 96 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1938).
MRobinson v. Rogers, 237 N.Y. 467, 143 N.E. 647 (1924); Hauptmann v. Fawcett,
243 App. Div. 613, 276 N.Y. Supp. 523 (935).
"237 N.Y. 467, 143 N.E. 647, 649 (1924).
243 App. Div. 613, 276 N.Y. Supp. 523 (1935).
"Ibid.
2Id. at 524.
"In re Hauptmann, 243 App. Div. 619, 277 N.Y. Supp. 631 (1935).
-4In re Martin's Will, 36 Misc 2d 1020, 234 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Surr. Ct. 1962) (dictum).
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the substituted security can be "actively" enforced while the retained
items could only have been "kept."
The attorney will lose his retaining lien when he voluntarily parts
with possession of the retained items.25 However, as was demonstrated
in the principal case, an involuntary parting with possession by court
order does not result in waiver of the lien.26 In addition to loss of the
lien by voluntary parting with possession, the lien may be lost by the
client's justifiably discharging the attorney.27 It is said that where an
attorney is guilty of misconduct the court may direct him to give up
any papers belonging to his client, even though his fees remain up-
paid. 2s Similarly, where an attorney voluntarily withdraws from a case,
any retaining lien which he might have had is forfeited. Moreover, in
Leszynsky v. Merritt29 it was held that an attorney may lose his lien
when he fails to make diligent efforts to have a court determine the
status of a claim for fees which he makes against his client but which
the client disputes.
When an attorney has property of his client on which he can assert
a valid retaining lien, and when such property is of peculiar value to
his client, the lien is invaluable.3 0 The attorney enjoys a degree of
leverage over his client without the cost of litigation and, even more
important, without the distasteful publicity which might accompany
a lawsuit for collection of fees. The law firm in the principal case was
fortunate in that it had corporate property in its possession on which
it could assert a valid retaining lien and without which the receiver
was unable to administer the adjustment and payment of other claims
of the insolvent business.
RICHARD J. TAvss
aKing v. Beale, 198 Va. 8o2, 96 S.E.2d 765 (1957) (dictum).
'6Supra note 6. Compare: H. & H. Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Smith, 54 N.J. Super.
347, 148 A.-2d 837 (App. Div. 1959).
,"If the application for substitution is based on the misconduct of an attorney,
it has been held that the court may direct an unconditional substitution, and order
that he give up the papers without payment of his fees, and leave him to bring an
action for his fees.
"But if the client brings no charges of misconduct against the attorney, but
merely elects to have a substitution, the court will grant it imposing such terms
as justice requires; and in such cases it is the general rule that a substitution will
not be authorized, without providing that the fees and expenses to the displaced
attorney shall be paid or secured to him, or his lien in some way preserved." The
Flush, supra note 17 at 28.
21The Flush, supra note 17.
--9 Fed. 688 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1881).
mIt was held in Davis v. Davis, 90 Fed. 791 (C.C. Mass. 1898), that an attorney
having a valid retaining lien may disregard, without fear of being in contempt of
court, a subponea duces tecum ordering the production of the retained items.
